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Abstract
Pragmatist views inspired by Peirce characterize the content of claims 
in terms of their practical consequences. The content of a claim is, on 
these views, determined by what actions are rationally recommended 
or supported by that claim. In this paper I examine the defeasibility of 
these relations of rational support. I will argue that such defeasibility 
introduces a particularist, occasion-sensitive dimension in pragmatist 
theories of content.  More precisely, my conclusion will be that, in the 
sort of framework naturally derived from Peirce’s pragmatist maxim, 
grasping conceptual contents is not merely a question of mastering 
general rules or principles codifying the practical import of claims, 
but decisively involves being sensitive to surrounding features of the 
particular situation at hand.
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Pragmatist views inspired by Peirce characterize the content of 
claims in terms of their practical consequences. The content of a 
claim is, on these views, determined by what actions are rationally 
recommended or supported by that claim. In this paper I examine 
the defeasibility of these relations of rational support. I will argue 
that such defeasibility introduces a particularist, occasion-sensitive 
dimension in pragmatist theories of content. More precisely, my 
conclusion will be that, in the sort of framework naturally derived 
from Peirce’s pragmatist maxim, grasping conceptual contents is not 
merely a question of mastering general rules or principles codifying 
the practical import of claims, but decisively involves being sensitive 
to surrounding features of the particular situation at hand.
The argument leading to these particularist conclusions can be 
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sketched as follows. In general, whether a given set of facts provides 
good reasons to act in some way (given certain goals) depends on the 
absence of obstacles or impediments — more broadly, on the ab-
sence of defeating conditions. Typically, the number of possible ob-
stacles and impediments for the success of some action is indefinitely 
large, so agents cannot rule out all of them before deciding what to 
do. I will argue that agents are only required to discard explicitly 
the presence of a possible practical impediment if such a possibility 
is relevant enough — that is, if there are good reasons to suspect that 
such an impediment might take place. Whether the truth of some 
claim recommends a certain course of action (given the agent’s goals) 
depends on whether the agent is in a position to rule out the presence 
of all relevant possible impediments for the success of such an ac-
tion — while non-relevant impediments may remain unconsidered. 
In turn, whether a given possible impediment is relevant enough is 
determined, I will claim, by the circumstances surrounding the oc-
casion of acting (for instance, by what environmental conditions are 
typical, by the information available to the agent and by practical 
features of the situation). Thus, in a pragmatist approach, grasping 
the content of a claim involves being sensitive to those features of the 
circumstances of action that make some possible impediments, and 
not others, relevant enough. In this way, intelligent thought and ac-
tion rely crucially on occasion-sensitive skills, even if generalizations 
and (defeasible) principles are still allowed to play a significant role 
in explaining and guiding our reasoning and agency.
1 Pragmatist theories of content
Peirce’s Pragmatist Maxim (PM) can be read as offering a character-
ization of the contents of beliefs or claims in terms of their practical 
consequences. This reading is naturally suggested by the following 
formulation of PM:
The entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of 
all general modes of rational conduct which, conditionally upon all the 
possible different circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the ac-
ceptance of the symbol. (Peirce 1998: 346)
An alternative formulation of PM presents this idea in an even 
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more striking way:
Pragmatism is the principle that every theoretical judgment express-
ible in a sentence in the indicative mood is a confused form of thought 
whose only meaning, if it has any, lies in its tendency to enforce a cor-
responding practical maxim expressible as a conditional sentence hav-
ing its apodosis in the imperative mood.(Peirce 1998: 134-135)
According to Peirce, thus, the content of a judgment is given by 
what it tells us to do — by the actions rationally recommended by 
such a judgement. For instance, if you judge that some berry is poi-
sonous, then the rational thing for you to do is to refrain from eating 
it (at least if you do not want to be poisoned). Likewise, that the desk 
is on fire gives you reason to apply water to it (assuming that you do 
not want the house to burn down). These “practical maxims” would 
partially determine the content of the judgments that the berry is 
poisonous and that the desk is on fire, respectively.
In this way, Peirce can be seen as laying the foundations of a prag-
matist semantic theory — more precisely, a pragmatist theory of 
content.1 My purposes here are not exegetical, so I am not interested 
in defending the historical accuracy of this interpretation of Peirce’s 
views. My only claim is that this sort of pragmatist theory of content 
is naturally inspired by Peirce’s formulations of PM. This pragmatist 
theory can be generalized by taking the content of a claim to be 
characterized by its role in both practical and theoretical inferences 
(see Brandom 1994; also Sellars 1953). On this inferentialist view, 
claims have the content they have by virtue of serving as reasons for 
acting and also for accepting further claims. The content of a claim, 
therefore, is a matter of what further conclusions (theoretical and 
practical) may be inferred from it, and from what premises it may be 
inferred. This inferentialist view of content is the natural extension 
of Peirce’s pragmatism.
On the face of it, one could think that the sort of inferentialist-
pragmatist position I have sketched endorses a generalist account of 
conceptual content. Semantic generalism can be roughly character-
ized as the view that semantic properties are determined by general 
1 For theories of content that can be seen as a development of Peirce’s insights, 
see Ramsey 1927, Sellars 1953, Brandom 1994, Whyte 1990, Dokic and Engel 
2002, Blackburn 2010: chapter 10.
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rules or principles (see Whiting 2007, 2010; Dancy 2004; Bergqvist 
2009). Insofar as the pragmatist approach I have presented seems — 
at least at first glance — to specify the content of claims in terms of 
general inferential rules (or maxims, in Peirce’s words), one could be 
tempted to classify it as a generalist perspective. Nevertheless I will 
argue that, on the contrary, pragmatist theories inspired by PM en-
tail a form of semantic particularism (Dancy 2004) — that is, a view 
according to which understanding the content of a claim is not (at 
least only) a question of grasping general rules or principles, but also 
requires mastering occasion-sensitive skills.2
The source of this occasion-sensitivity is to be found, I will ar-
gue, in the fact that content-determining inferences are in general 
defeasible and subject to exceptions (in other words, they are non-
monotonic inferences). It may come as a surprise that I appeal to the 
defeasibility of content-determining inferential rules in order to pin-
point the particularist nature of pragmatist-inferentialist accounts of 
content. After all, one could think that resorting to defeasible rules 
is precisely the best strategy for having rules that are still general but 
manage to accommodate the possibility of exceptions.3 However, I 
will contend that it is itself an occasion-sensitive issue which defea-
sible inferential rules are available in some particular situation. The 
same piece of reasoning may be (defeasibly) good on one occasion 
and enthymematic on another one — even if no exception or obstacle is 
actually taking place on this latter occasion for acting. Although this is so 
both for theoretical and practical inferences, I will focus on the lat-
ter, since they constitute the basis of pragmatist semantics.
2 The defeasibility of practical reasoning
Practical inferences are typically non-monotonic. The introduction 
of new premises (consistent with the old ones) may turn a good piece 
2 The contrast between generalism and particularism has been mainly devel-
oped in meta-ethical debates about the role played by principles in morality (see 
Dancy 2004, Väyrynen 2011, Hooker and Little 2000, Lance and Little 2006, 
McKeever and Ridge 2006, Thomas 2011).
3 Väyrynen (2009), for instance, develops a generalist theory of morality in 
terms of defeasible, hedged principles.
223Pragmatism and Semantic Particularism
of practical reasoning into a bad one. An action that is recommended 
by a certain set of premises may stop being so recommended when 
a further premise is added. By contrast, the goodness of monotonic 
inferences cannot be revoked by the introduction of new premises 
(consistent with the old ones): in monotonic inferences, after intro-
ducing a new collateral premise, one can still infer everything that 
could be inferred before.
When the goodness of an inference is revoked by the introduc-
tion of additional premises, the inference is said to have been de-
feated; accordingly, these additional premises are usually known as 
defeaters. It is customary to make a distinction between two types 
of defeaters: rebutting defeaters and undercutting or disabling ones 
(Pollock 1987, Dancy 2004, Horty 2012).
Rebutting defeaters are countervailing reasons. One way in which 
a new premise may defeat the goodness of an inference is by pro-
viding stronger reasons against the conclusion. In this case, the old 
premises still give reasons in favor of the conclusion, but these rea-
sons are outweighed by the defeating considerations. For instance, 
the fact that going to the cinema is fun gives me reasons to go to see 
a film; however, these reasons are outweighed by the fact that I need 
to stay at home working, which is a stronger reason against going to 
the cinema. The fact that watching a film would be fun still counts in 
favor of going to the cinema, but there are other considerations that 
count more strongly against doing so.
Another way in which a new premise may defeat the goodness of 
an inference is by undercutting it, that is by preventing the original 
premises from counting as offering good reasons in favor of the con-
clusion. After the introduction of the defeater, the other premises 
would stop providing reasons to perform the action previously rec-
ommended. Some fact p may be prevented from being a good reason 
to do A due to some further defeating fact q: p would count in favor 
of doing A in a situation where q did not obtain, but it does not so 
count if q obtains. I will focus here on this sort of defeating condi-
tion, usually known as undercutting defeater or disabler (see Dancy 
2004, Pollock 1987).4
4 Dancy (2004) also distinguishes attenuators (considerations that attenu-
ate the weight of some reason) and intensifiers (considerations that enhance the 
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An example of undercutting defeat in theoretical reasoning is the 
following. From the fact that a bottle of juice has been in the fridge 
for a couple of hours, one may prima facie conclude that the juice 
will be cold. However, this piece of reasoning becomes bad if the 
fridge was unplugged. If the fridge was actually unplugged, then the 
fact that a bottle has been in the fridge is not after all a reason to 
think that it is cold (the rational connection between that consider-
ation and the conclusion that the bottle is cold has been undermined 
or disabled).
To be sure, if you do not know that the fridge is unplugged, it may 
appear to you that there are reasons to think that the bottle of juice is 
cold (since it has been in the fridge for a while). That is, you may have 
apparent or subjective reasons to endorse this conclusion — it may 
be reasonable for you to endorse it. Yet there will be no objective 
reasons favoring such a conclusion.5 The facts do not actually sup-
port it; indeed, the conclusion may be false (the bottle may actually 
be warm). In this sense, your inference was not good — its goodness 
was defeated. If you did know that the disabling defeater obtained (i.e. 
that the fridge was unplugged) then, on top of this, you were unrea-
sonable, to the extent that you were endorsing a conclusion for which 
you thought there were no (undefeated) reasons.
Practical reasoning can also be undercut. I will focus on pieces of 
practical reasoning in which an action is recommended as a means 
for achieving some end. This type of reasoning will be undercut if 
there are obstacles or impediments thwarting the success of the ac-
tion recommended as a means for the agent’s end.
Consider the following example. The fact that the traffic light is 
red is, generally, a reason to press the brake pedal (in order to avoid 
weight of some reason). Disablers (i.e. undercutting defeaters) could be seen as a 
limiting case of attenuators. Schroeder (2011) proposes to account for undercut-
ting defeat generally in terms of attenuation.
5 For the distinction between objective and subjective or apparent reasons, 
see Álvarez 2010: 24, Parfit 2011: 33-35, Schroeder 2007: 14-15, Sylvan 2015 
and Whiting 2014. As I will understand the distinction, objective reasons are 
facts that actually count in favor of some reaction. Subjective or apparent reasons 
are considerations that the subject takes to count in favor of some reaction — but 
it may be that they do not actually do so, in which case they are merely apparent 
reasons.
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accidents). However, if the brake pedal happens to be disconnected 
from the car’s brakes, there would not actually be good reasons to 
press the brake pedal (rather, there are reasons to use the hand brake 
or to drive the car into the field besides the road, so that you do not 
harm anyone). That the brake pedal is disconnected from the car 
brakes is an undercutting defeater for the original piece of reasoning 
— it is an impediment for the success of your attempt to slow down 
the car by pressing the brake pedal  (although such an attempt would 
be successful in a situation where the pedal were properly connected 
to the car brakes).
Another example. The fact that the desk is on fire is a reason to 
apply water to the desk. But if the fire is electrical, then you actually 
have reasons not to apply water (it would be dangerous to do so). 
When the fire is electrical, applying water to it is not a good means 
to achieve the goal of extinguishing the fire.
A final example: that your friend is being threatened by some 
thugs is a reason to call the police. But if the police department is 
corrupt and allied with the thugs, then you do not have reasons to 
turn to the police, but rather to avoid doing so.
Note that in all these examples, the initial premises of your rea-
soning do not turn out to be false: it is true that the desk is on fire or 
that your friend is being threatened by thugs. What happens is that 
further facts (perhaps unknown to you) prevent such known prem-
ises from giving reasons to perform certain actions (e.g. to apply 
water to the desk, or to call the police). In general, whether a fact p 
is a reason for an agent to do A depends on certain defeating condi-
tions not obtaining.
3 Relevant defeaters
One could argue that an agent is not entitled to perform a given ac-
tion unless she has ruled out the presence of all possible defeaters 
for the reasons recommending her action. However, in many cases 
the number of possible defeaters seems to be indefinitely large; with 
some imagination, one can always come up with further defeating 
possibilities (see Brandom 2000). If this is the case — as I will as-
sume —, then agents will not be in general in a position to rule 
out all possible defeaters (all possible impediments for the success 
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of their actions). Does this mean that practical reasoning is always 
enthymematic? I think not: it only means that our practical reasoning 
is usually defeasible. We often reason in absence of full information, 
but this does not make our reasoning enthymematic or defective (see 
Horty 2012: 81-91). Agents may be entitled to perform some action 
even if they have not ruled out all possible defeaters. Their entitle-
ment, however, will be defeasible: it may be revoked if some defeat-
ing condition actually obtains.
Once it is granted that not all defeating possibilities have to 
be explicitly considered, the question that arises is which of such 
possibilities have to be ruled out by the premises of our reasoning and 
which may remain unconsidered in the background. My proposal is 
the following. In order to count as entitled to perform some action, 
I submit, agents only need to rule out defeating possibilities that 
are relevant enough, and I will take it that a defeating possibility is 
relevant enough if there are (strong enough) reasons to suspect that 
it may obtain. When relevant defeating possibilities are not ruled 
out, the agent will not count as having good reasons to endorse 
the conclusion of her practical reasoning — her piece of practical 
reasoning will be enthymematic (even if said defeating possibilities 
did not actually obtain). It will not be rational to act guided by certain 
apparent reasons if you have good reasons to suspect that defeating 
conditions for those reasons may obtain. In contrast, irrelevant 
possible defeaters may remain unconsidered without making the 
inference enthymematic — they can be properly ignored (for the 
notion of properly ignoring, see Lewis 1996, Blome-Tillmann 2009, 
McKenna 2014).
When is a possible defeating condition relevant? I will argue that 
it depends on the circumstances surrounding the occasion of action, 
including contextual and practical factors.
4 The occasion-sensitivity of reasons for action
I have claimed that only relevant defeating possibilities need to be 
ruled out, and that a defeating possibility is relevant if there are 
reasons to suspect that it may obtain. Plausibly, whether there are 
reasons to have such suspicions depends on surrounding features of 
the occasion of action. More specifically, I submit, it will depend on 
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whether the occurrence of the defeater is likely enough or rationally 
expectable in the circumstances in which the action is to be carried 
out.
One first factor that arguably has a say on the relevance of a de-
feating possibility is what conditions are typical in the environment 
in which the action is to be performed. For instance, if electrical 
fires are very rare in a given environment (say, there is no electrical 
equipment around), then the agent will be entitled to apply water to 
a fire without being required to discard the possibility that its origin 
is electrical. However, in an environment where electrical fires are 
common, this possibility will be relevant and agents will have to rule 
it out before counting as having reasons to apply water to a fire.
So, if a defeater is likely to obtain in the sort of environment in 
which an action takes place, such a defeater needs to be explicitly 
considered — there are reasons to suspect that it may obtain. This is 
analogous to what happens in epistemology with fake barn scenarios 
(see Goldman 1976). The standard appraisal of such scenarios is that, 
if the agent happens to be in a fake-barn county environment (where 
fake barns are frequent), she needs to be in a position to discard the 
defeating possibility that she is facing a fake barn, in order to count 
as knowing (in virtue of her visual perception) that there is a barn in 
front of her; however, the agent is not required to be in a position to 
rule out such a defeating possibility when she is in ordinary environ-
ments, where fake barns are rare. Practical reasoning, I have argued, 
is sensitive to environmental conditions in an analogous way.
Furthermore, whether some defeating possibility is relevant will 
plausibly also depend on the information accessible to the agent. In 
particular, information contextually available may alter the likeli-
hood (in relation to the agent’s perspective) of certain possible de-
featers, and thereby modify the relevance of such possibilities. For 
example, if you do not know that you are in “harmless snake island” 
(where snakes are in general harmless), you will have reasons to sus-
pect that a snake may be venomous: given your information, it is a 
relevant possibility (let us assume that the larger world you inhabit 
is such that snakes are usually dangerous). However, this possibility 
stops being relevant — or at least becomes less relevant — if you 
know that you are in “harmless snake island”.
One may even argue that false or misleading information can 
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make some defeating possibility relevant for an agent. Suppose that 
you have convincing information (coming from a generally reliable 
source) suggesting that the police department may be corrupt and 
allied with the thugs of the city. Then you will have reasons to regard 
this possibility as relevant — to suspect that it may be the case —, even 
if the information is in fact misleading and the police department is 
not, and has never been, corrupt.
Moreover, it seems that whether a defeating possibility is relevant 
enough to merit consideration will depend on practical issues, such as 
how high stakes are and the costs associated with the agent’s decision. 
This is analogous to the sensitivity of knowledge claims to practical 
factors (as discussed, among others, by Fantl and McGrath (2009) 
and Stanley (2005)). To take a well-known example: if the conse-
quences of not going to the bank before Monday are catastrophic, 
one will need to rule out additional defeating possibilities before be-
ing entitled to conclude that one can wait until Saturday to go to the 
bank (since it was open last Saturday). For instance, one may need to 
make sure that the bank has not changed its time-table — whereas 
in low stakes circumstances it may be rational to wait until Saturday 
even if this possibility has not been considered.
Similarly, imagine that the consequences of your eating nuts are 
only mildly negative (you do not like the taste); then, reading in the 
menu that some salad is nut-free could be enough to be entitled to 
conclude that you may eat the salad. If, on the contrary, ingesting 
nuts would have dreary results (say, you are allergic) you may need 
to discard further possibilities that in more relaxed contexts could 
remain unconsidered (for instance, the possibility that the menu is 
out of date, or that the cook has made some mistake when preparing 
the salad).
Arguably, practical stakes and costs do not affect so much the 
strength of the reasons to suspect that some defeater may obtain, but 
rather how strong these reasons must be in order for the defeater to 
require explicit consideration. Practical factors would contribute to 
fixing the threshold of relevance below which a defeating possibil-
ity may remain unconsidered (in high stakes contexts the threshold 
will be lower). In this way, practical factors do not seem to alter 
the level of support offered by the premises of the agent’s reason-
ing; nevertheless, these factors plausibly have a say in determining 
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whether such level of support is enough for the agent to be rationally 
entitled to endorse the conclusion (i.e. to act on it). An action rec-
ommended by the agent’s evidence may stop being so recommended 
in an alternative context in which practical stakes are higher (even if 
no impediments actually obtain in either of the contexts).
5 Practical defeasibility and the occasion-sensitivity of 
pragmatist semantics
I have argued that whether some known facts give good reasons to 
perform a certain action depends on the circumstances surrounding 
the occasion of action — it depends on what defeating possibilities 
are relevant enough from the perspective of the context in which the 
practical deliberation is being carried out (and perhaps assessed). In 
this way, the goodness of inferential relations of rational support (i.e. 
what is a good reason for what) is sensitive to contextual factors.6
A consequence of this is that pragmatist theories of content turn 
out to be occasion-sensitive as well. These theories characterize the 
content of claims in terms of their role in theoretical and practi-
cal reasoning, in particular in terms of the conclusions that may be 
inferred from them. But it follows from the discussion above that 
the same practical inference may be good in a given context and en-
thymematic in another one, even if no obstacle is actually present in 
either context. This is so because in some contexts agents will need 
to rule out defeating possibilities that in other contexts are not rel-
evant and, therefore, can remain unconsidered without making the 
agent’s reasoning enthymematic (e.g. in some contexts but not others 
one will be required to rule out the possibility of the fire having elec-
trical origin, before being entitled to conclude that applying water to 
the desk is a “mode of rational conduct” which ensues from knowing 
that the desk is on fire).
Thus, pragmatism provides a particularist, occasion-sensitive 
view of content. The reason-giving relations that, on these views, 
determine content are occasion-sensitive and cannot be captured 
6 It must be noted this global conclusion about practical reasoning is compat-
ible with claiming that there are some undefeasible general moral principles (say, 
the principle that it is wrong to kill innocent people).
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by a generalist model — content-determining rational relations are 
holistic, in the sense that they are underpinned by a background of 
(typically indefinitely many) anti-defeating conditions. This does 
not mean, however, that general rules have no place in a pragmatist 
framework. Defeasible, general rules still guide our reasoning and 
action, although occasion-sensitive skills are required in order to ap-
preciate whether one is in the sort of context where a certain defea-
sible general rule prima facie applies.
Take the rule that one should call the police when threatened by 
thugs. In ordinary contexts, it seems rational to follow this general 
rule. However, there may be further contexts in which members of 
the police are typically corrupt and therefore such a rule does not 
apply; actually, in these contexts it could be that the rule that should 
be generally applied is to avoid the police when threatened by thugs. 
A competent reasoner must be able to adjust her reasoning disposi-
tions appropriately when perceiving this sort of contextual change.
One possible way for the pragmatist to incorporate this occasion-
sensitivity is to say that the content of claims depends on the con-
text of action — the sentence ‘The desk is on fire’ would express 
different contents in contexts where the possibility that the fire has 
electrical origins is relevant and in contexts where it is not. This will 
be problematic if one favors a view in which communication requires 
being able to share and transmit common contents across different 
practical contexts.
An alternative possibility is to take the content of claims to re-
main constant across practical contexts, even if their practical 
consequences may vary. The content of a claim would be charac-
terized as a function from practical contexts (and goals) to actions 
licensed. Grasping the content of a claim would amount to know-
ing what actions it recommends on each practical context (given the 
agent’s goals and collateral beliefs). Although this function would be 
context-invariant, in order for an agent to be able to properly think 
and talk in accordance to it, she would need to be sufficiently sensi-
tive to the relevant contextual features (e.g. typical environmental 
conditions, how high stakes are) that determine the practical conse-
quences of the claim on a given occasion. The resulting pragmatist 
view would still require that competent users of conceptual contents 
master certain occasion-sensitive skills.
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These proposals for modelling the occasion-sensitivity of pragma-
tist semantics certainly need to be further developed and discussed; 
however, this is something that lies beyond the scope of this paper. 
My purpose has been more modest: I have tried to show that a perva-
sive form of occasion-sensitivity arises in pragmatist semantic theo-
ries that characterize the content of claims in terms of their involve-
ment in defeasible practical reasoning.
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